In this paper we develop a new view of organizations as disequilibrium systems. To introduce our ideas and some terminology we use a simple economic model of a firm. We demonstrate that the decisions made by the management might cause a regular or chaotic evolution of the firm, and that the latter gives inferior results in terms of certain performance measures. We also show that the management can stabilize and control chaotic dynamics by implementing suitable organizational rules. Using these concepts we then go on to present a description of organizations as disequilibrium systems which differs from the one presented in the literature. The firm's evolution occurs on a chaotic attractor, which is neither the final nor the desired state from the management's point of view. Instead the decision makers of the firm try to steer the firm into a predetermined unstable state embedded in this chaotic atttractor by employing suitable organizational rules. If their implementation is successful the undesired fluctuations are effectively removed and performance is improved. As this chosen target state is shifted when structural parameters of the firm's environment change, repeated adaptations of the implemented organizational rules are indicated.
Introduction
In the last years the discoveries in the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems have been often used as metaphors to describe organizations as disequilibrium systems. It has been argued that the observed sudden changes in the history of a firm can be seen as bifurcations, where the system changes from equilibrium to non-equilibrium behavior (e.g., Loye and Eisler 1987, Gordon 1992) . The dynamic evolution of firms has been described as occurring on chaotic attractors, i.e., although chaotic on a micro-scale the system shows some regularity on a macroscopic level (Thietart and Forgues 1997) . These attractors have been described as "islands of stability" which emerge in the sea of chaos (see Thietart and Forgues 1995, Guastello 1995) . The divergent development of initially similar firms over time has been argued to be just an instance of the so-called "butterfly effect" or the sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990) , which is one of the distinguishing features of chaotic dynamical systems. The use of such metaphors have become quite popular and lead to a considerable number of publications in the literature on Social Sciences, Organization Theory and Management (see, e.g., Kiel and Elliott 1996 , Guastello 1995 , Parker and Stacey 1994 , Levy 1994 .
For someone who is familiar with the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems a careful study of this literature shows that quite a few of these articles use these metaphors in an inappropriate way and that it became fashionable to develop some kind of "jargon" without being precise about the (mathematical) meaning of the terms. As Polley (1997) emphasizes in his essay on the use of chaos metaphors, " [M] etaphorical use of scientific terms also presents a risk.
Incorrect use of source language (literals) may generate mistaken insights in the new domain causing any benefit from the metaphor source to be lost. " (p. 446) . Furthermore, the arguments for a certain viewpoint oftentimes are given only verbally, without developing a rigorous model which would make it more transparent to the reader what the authors have in mind.
In this paper we share the view of organizations as systems "out of equilibrium". In order to introduce the ideas developed here in a precise framework and to illustrate their meaning we use a simple dynamic model. This model incorporates the interaction of the market and the firm´s decision makers who decide how much to produce depending on the profit of the previous period. We use this model as a vehicle to demonstrate three things: First, we prove that the decisions of the management of the firm might cause both regular and chaotic dynamics. Second, we show that in our model chaotic behavior leads to inferior results in terms of average profit, average sales revenue and average sales in comparison with the performance in (stable or unstable) target staes, e.g., in the equilibrium or in the 2-cycle. We then, finally, answer the question of how a chaotic system can be controlled and demonstrate that the performance of the firm can be improved by using these control methods. After we have introduced these ideas and methods we start out to develop a rigorous model of an organization as a disequilibrium system. We illustrate how the organization of the firm has to adapt and evolve over time as firms are open systems which are embedded in a dynamically changing environment. As some structural parameters are shifted, the firm is thrown out of its current "disequilibrium" target situation and has to be steered back into another target state.
We argue that the management of a firm has a key role in achieving such target states and in leading the firm in the transient phases. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the simple model. In section 3 we develop a model of a firm as a disequilibrium system. We end the paper with section 4 where some conclusions are given.
Developing the framework

A simple model
In order to introduce the terminology and ideas used below we use a simple economic model of a firm.
1 Let us consider a competitive market in which prices are determined by market clearing. To keep the model as simple as possible all firms are assumed to be equal. The decision makers of the firms have to decide at the beginning of period t+1 how much to produce without knowing the price of that period. All they have is a price expectation p t+1 e which is assumed to depend on the price of the previous period. The produced output will be shipped to the market and is then sold for the actual market price. During the process of deciding how much to produce the decision makers have to consider two constraints: First, financial resources (working capital) in period t+1 are given by F t+1 . The achieved profit P t in period t can be used either for internal financing or else can be paid out in the form of dividends. If we denote the retention rate with r, then F t+1 = rP t . Second, firms are assumed to have access to the capital market where they can acquire short term capital in period t which has to be paid back in the subsequent period, where the interest rate is i. Let the parameter δ denote the share of the production costs which is financed by the working capital F t+1 and the parameter γ denote the costs per unit of production. Suppose furthermore, that market prices are determined by a linear inverse demand curve of the form p t = α−β(nx t ), where nx t denotes the total supply of the n firms in the market. Then, taking all that into account, the constrained maximization problem of each sales-maximizing firm is max x t e t p x subject to x rP
1 For a more general version of this model the reader is referred to Kopel (1997) , where references to the literature and more details on the economic foundation of the assumptions are given.
where P t = P(x t ) = (α−βnx t )x t −(1−δ)(1+i)γx t (the first term is the sales revenue, the second term is the share of the production costs of the previous period which has been financed by external funds and has to be paid back in the current period). If we assume naive adaptive expectations, i.e. p t+1 e = p t , then the sales-maximizing production choice is
. This (difference) equation incorporates in a simple way the complex interactions of production and financial decisions of the firm's managers. It is obvious that these managers are boundedly rational though: their behavior is only locally, but not globally, optimal since they do not take into account the global structure of environmental feedback. In what follows we are not interested in the details of the model.
Hence, we set κ := r/δγ, a := α, b := βn and c := (1−δ)(1+i)γ. Using these definitions the model then reads
with P(x t ) = (a−bx t )x t −cx t .
Dynamics of the model
In this section we will analyze the resulting dynamical behavior of the production sequences generated by the decision rule (1) depending on the choices of κ. This parameter is under control of the management, and might be used, for example, to simulate the choice of the retention rate r. In particular, we have the following result:
Lemma 1: The map f(x,κ), which generates the nonlinear dynamical system (1) exhibits the same qualitative dynamics as the well-known quadratic map h(x,µ) which generates the system z t+1 = h(z t ,µ) = µz t (1-z t ). In particular, we have the relations x t = (a-c)z t /b and µ = κ(ac).
Proof: Multiply both sides of equation (1) 
Performance measures and ergodic results
The previous subsection showed that regular and chaotic dynamics are possible depending on the decision of the management. From the viewpoint of the firm it is far more interesting, however, if chaotic dynamics are advantageous or not. In order to make things precise we introduce three performance measures:
where P(x t ) = (a−bx t )x t −cx t and R(x t ) = (a−bx t )x t .
It is easy to calculate the resulting performance measures obtained when the system is in the fixed point or in the 2-cycle shown in Table 1 . In the fixed point the average profit is
1 . In the 2-cycle the average profit is the average of the sum of the profits obtained in each of the two points x 1 and x 2 . Hence, we get
Note that this result is only valid
for parameter values where the 2-cycle exists, see Table 1 . In the same way we can derive expressions for the average sales revenue and the average sales in the fixed point and the 2-cycle. Furthermore, we are able to determine the changes of these performance measures when the parameter κ is varied (given that the system is in the fixed point or in the 2-cycle) and give some qualitative description how these performance measures behave. It is easy to see, for example, that AP(x ** ,κ) has a maximum for κ = 2/(a-c) and that AP(x ** ,κ) > AP(x 1 ,κ) for κ > 3/(a-c). If we want to calculate the performance measures when the production paths exhibit chaotic dynamics, the problem becomes much more complicated, however.
In what follows, we will focus on the case κ = 4/(a-c).
2 Chaotic trajectories are unstable and wander in an erratic fashion, resembling those which are generated by stochastic processes.
Hence, it seems quite natural to ask if chaotic trajectories stemming from a deterministic system may have statistical properties like those associated with nondeterministic, stochastic processes. This would enable us to understand the nature of chaotic behavior and how important it is in a given system, that is, how robust it is when initial conditions of the system are changed. In fact, in recent years results have been given which establish a relation between the statistical properties of trajectories and the measure of a dynamical system. One of these results, the Birkhoff-von Neumann Mean Ergodic Theorem, is of particular help in order to calculate the performance of chaotically fluctuating production sequences in our model.
Theorem 1 (see Day, 1994) : Let (D,Σ,τ) be a probability space and let θ be measure preserving and ergodic. Let g(.) be an integrable function. Then
The left side is the average value of g(.) evaluated along the trajectory generated by θ. The right side is the expected value of g(.) evaluated on the space D. Thus, this theorem asserts that the time average equals the space average. This theorem is of great help, because if the measure τ is absolutely continuous with density ρ, then the integral on the right hand side of the equation above can be easily calculated. For the dynamical system which is generated by the quadratic map (see Lemma 1) with µ = 4 (corresponding to κ = 4/(a-c)), the density ρ of the (ergodic) measure has been calculated to be ρ π ( ) ( ) z z z = − 1 1 for 0 < z < 1, see Medio (1992) . This means that a "typical" trajectory resembles the realization of a stochastic process with density function ρ(z), and that regions near the two boundaries of the unit interval are visited with higher probability (see also Peitgen et al. 1992 , for results and an intuitive explanation). Knowing this, we can use Lemma 1 and the "change of variable" technique to determine the density σ(x) of the measure associated with our dynamical system (1) for κ = 4/(a-c).
Since we now know the functional form of the density σ(x), by using Theorem 1 we can calculate the value of the performance measure for the chaotic case κ = 4/(a-c) by evaluating the corresponding integral. In the appendix we demonstrate this for one particular example. Table   2 summarizes the values of the performance measures for κ = κ 0 = 4/(a-c) in the fixed point, in the 2-cycle and for a chaotically fluctuating production sequence.
Fixed point Table 2 : Values of the performance measures average profit, average sales revenue and average sales for κ 0 = 4/(a-c) calculated in the fixed point, in the 2-cycle and for a chaotically fluctuating production sequence.
It is now obvious that in the case κ 0 = 4/(a-c) the chaotically fluctuating production sequence leads to inferior performance than fixed-point sequences and 2-cyclic sequences in our model.
Hence, the conclusion is that chaotic dynamics leads to worse results for the firm than regular dynamics. 
Controlling chaotic dynamics
The results given above show that chaotically fluctuating production sequences lead to worse performance than in the (stable or unstable) fixed point or in the 2-cycle. Hence, it is desirable from the firms' point of view to get rid of erratic fluctuations. One way out for the management is to choose a parameter value of κ inside the region where the production sequences would converge to the stable fixed point or 2-cycle. This would yield stable dynamics and improved performance. Oftentimes though, the intervention possibilities for decision makers are restricted. Suppose that the management has chosen κ=4/(a-c) and that this parameter can be changed only slightly. Now the management finds itself trapped, since small changes of the parameter just lead to other erratically fluctuating production sequences and, accordingly, to low average performance measures. Fortunately there is a way out, namely to actively try to control chaotic dynamics. The idea how that works is simple and uses two quite distinct properties of chaotic systems.
The first one is the sensitive dependence on small changes of initial conditions and parameters. In chaotic systems small changes in initial conditions or in the values of a key parameter cause the system to exhibit quite a different evolution over time (see, e.g., Gordon
and Greenspan 1994). Two trajectories, even when they are close at the beginning, are diverging due to the folding and stretching property of chaotic systems (see, e.g., Peitgen et al. 1992) . The second property which is used for controlling chaos is the fact that at the undisputed in the economics community, however. For an example and references to the literature the reader is referred to Kopel et al. (1998) .
bifurcation values given in Table 1 , the fixed point, 2-cycle, 4-cycle and so on, just change their stability properties. They become unstable (repelling) at the corresponding values, but remain existent "in the background". Although these states cannot be observed in numerical simulations as they are unstable, they are actually the kind of order you can find in chaotic systems in the following sense: if the production sequence would get close let's say to the unstable fixed point, it would remain close for a while and only eventually would get repelled from it. The same is true for every unstable cycle which exists in the background, and there are many: The system (1) exhibits chaotic behavior for κ = 4/(a-c) but unstable cycles of every Using these two properties of chaotic systems, the management might try the following procedure: choose one of the unstable cycles (one which gives a superior performance, in our case the fixed point or the 2-cycle) as a target state and attempt to steer the production sequence close to this target state by slightly changing the parameter κ using the sensitive dependence on parameters. The question remains how this can be done in a systematic manner. Recent results show that the management can use a combination of two different methods (see also Kopel 1997 for details and references). The first method -called "targeting"
-requires global knowledge of the system's dynamics and leads the system into a small neighborhood of the target state. The second one is based on a linearization of the nonlinear system around the target and uses only local information of the systems' dynamics and keeps the system close to the target state. 5 To present these two methods in a more precise way, let ∆κ be the maximal adjustment of the parameter possible in the current period, with ∆κ ε ≤ <<1. Let x ** be the target state (here the equilibrium), x 0 be the production quantity of the current period and suppose the dynamical system generated by the map f(x,κ) is chaotic
, then under certain conditions we can be assured that x f I n ** ( ) ∈ for some n (see Bala et al. 1998 ). Due to the sensitive dependence on initial conditions and parameters, the interval I is stretched until it contains the target x**.
What this means is that the decision makers can find a suitable one-shot intervention (i.e. a slight adjustment of the parameter κ) in the current period such that the system would without further intervention come close to the target state after n more periods (note that f(x,κ) depends continuously on κ) . As mentioned above, since the target state is unstable, the production sequence would be stabilized only for a few periods. Hence, the question arises if the production path can be controlled such that it stays close to the target state once it is in a neighborhood. In order to see how that works, suppose the management was successful in bringing the production path close to the (unstable) equilibrium x , the linearization above gives the required parameter adjustment in order to achieve that: In order to demonstrate how a chaotically fluctuating production path can be controlled to exhibit only small variations around the desired (unstable) target state by using these two results -the global and the local method of controlling chaos -let us consider an example. Let the parameters in our model (1) be a=20, b=5, and c=4. For κ 0 =4/(a-c)=1/4 the resulting production sequences generated by using decision rule (1) fluctuate chaotically and result in low values of the performance measures (see Table 1 ). The average profit of this chaotic production sequence would be AP(x, 1/4)=6.4, whereas it would be AP(x . Suppose the current production quantity is x 0 =2.56 and that κ 0 =1/4. In this case by adjusting the choice parameter to κ=0.24586 in the first period and then switch it back to κ 0 =1/4, the production path would get close to the equilibrium state x ** after 4 more periods. This would lead to a stabilization in the short run, whereas without intervention the fluctuations would be large (see Fig. 1 ).
Insert Figure 1 here Note that after period 12 the fluctuations of the production path become stronger again.
Hence, in order to keep the path close to the target (and the fluctuations only small), the management can employ the local method. It has to monitor the production path and every time the deviation of the production quantity of the next period from the target would get greater than a predetermined value (e.g. 0.01), the parameter is slightly adjusted according to the local correction method. Figure 2 shows the fluctuations of the production path around the target state x **
. Note how small the necessary adjustments are to keep the path in a predetermined neighborhood of the target.
Insert Figure 2 here An application of these two methods not only enables the management to get rid of undesired erratic fluctuations, but also improves the performance. If the production sequence is successfully steered close to the target state x ** and stays close to it, the resulting performance of the controlled path is close to the performance evaluated in the target state. As an example, for the controlled path we get (for a time horizon of T=100) an average profit of 9.55, which is quite close to the average profit of 9.6 in the (unstable) target state x ** . This then proves that the performance in terms of profit, sales revenue and sales can be improved considerably by stabilizing and controlling chaotic fluctuations by using the two methods introduced above.
Firms as evolving adaptive systems in disequilibrium
In the previous section we have shown that certain decisions of the management might cause chaotic behavior of the system, which cannot be removed easily because the decision makers are restricted to only slight alterations of their initial choice. It was also demonstrated that chaotic dynamics might lead to inferior results in terms of certain performance measures.
Finally, it was illustrated that the management can get rid of chaotic dynamics by a small, but suitable intervention and improve the performance.
Our analysis shows that statements like, "...systems exhibiting chaotic behaviors can only be understood, whereas, nonchaotic systems can be understood, predicted, and perhaps controlled." (Gregersen and Sailer 1993) are to pessimistic. In fact, chaotic systems are more flexible in the sense that it enables the decision-maker to choose between an infinite number of target states, which establish the underlying order on the chaotic attractor. This is the basis for a different view of management, since organizations are changeable only when they are sustained in "disequilibrium" (see also Parker and Stacey 1994) . The possibility of meaningful interventions by actors attempting to influence the system is fundamental to teleological processes as stressed in Polley (1997) . If the decision makers would like to exploit the flexibility of chaotic systems, they could intentionally move the system into situations that result in turbulence and then try to control this turbulence. In this sense, turbulence is not just a source of disorder, but also a key element in a process that leads to new order (see Thietart and Forgues 1995). Our analysis then proves the suggestion, "... that turbulence may be useful and even subject to teleological interventions." Furthermore, it answers the question: "Is turbulence manageable?", Polley (1997, p. 455) , and resolves the puzzle that the lack of predictability of chaotic systems might seem to make a controlled organization impossible.
In this section we use the ideas introduced above to develop a framework for the view of organizations as "disequilibrium systems". Before doing that several remarks should be made.
First, note that we use the term "disequilibrium system" in a different way than other authors do. Here it is used in the sense that the desired target state is unstable and the firm would be repelled away from it without active intervention by the management. Second, in our framework the firm only evolves on a chaotic attractor without control. Interventions by the management steer the firm into a desired target state (which is embedded in the attractor together with other unstable potential target states) and this effectively removes the undesirable erratic fluctuations. Note again that in contrast to other authors (e.g., Thietart and Forgues 1995, Guastello 1995) we consider the unstable target states as the "islands of stability". Third and last, observe that the management establishes two quite different organizational rules to achieve stabilization and control: the global rule which is intended to lead the firm close to the target state requires global knowledge of the system's dynamics; the local rule is only valid in a small neighborhood around the target state but also requires only knowledge of the local properties of the dynamical system. Obviously, both organizational rules are needed to effectively stabilize and control the evolution of the firm.
Let us consider first a situation where the environment in which the firm operates does not change. Here we refer to a situation in which the parameter values, in particular, of the inverse market demand curve, a and b, do not alter. Suppose that as in our simple model the management of the firm has chosen a value of the parameter(s) in their decision rule such that the system behaves chaotic. Furthermore, suppose that these fluctuations are undesirable from the firm's viewpoint since it leads to inferior results in terms of profit, sales revenue, and sales, but the possibilities for adjusting the initially chosen value of the parameters are restricted. Then the management is in a situation which we tried to capture in our model. The following organizational steps are necessary to improve the situation. First, the management has to achieve knowledge of the way the dynamics of the system as a whole work. Second, it has to find a suitable target state -a "window of opportunity" -and a small but suitably chosen adjustment to bring the firm close to this target state. To do all this, decisions on the highest management level are necessary since global knowledge of the functioning of the system is required. Third, once the system is close to the target state it can be kept there by an organizational rule which does not require global knowledge, but only local information.
Accordingly, lower levels of the hierarchy in the organization might be employed to carry out the necessary steps. This task is suitable to be delegated. If successfully implemented, these steps effectively stabilize and control the firm in a region with higher performance. Note that continuous monitoring and repeated interventions are necessary since the target state is unstable. The framework we described finds support in the literature on organizations and management. There it is emphasized that the management plays a key role in the success of a firm (see, e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990) . The fact that the decision makers must try to understand the global dynamics of the system might be seen as just a formalization of the sentence: "Managers literally must wade into the ocean of events that surround the organization and actively try to make sense of them." (Weick and Daft 1984, p. 286) . The management has to find a suitable target state or a "fit" of the organization with its competitive environment and must try to tame the turbulence by leading the firm close to this state, since "[t]he organization needs order and stability to be able to achieve its mission as an organization" (Thietart and Forgues 1995, p. 24) . Note that, since the target state is unstable, a failure to understand the dynamics or lack of monitoring might cause the organization to drift away from the "fit" until some crisis provokes a return to the equilibrium (see Parker and Stacey 1994 ).
If we want our framework to capture the features of dynamically evolving markets, we have to take into account that certain structural parameters might change over time. " [N] o system can be stabilized forever," as De Greene (1996) puts it. Let us suppose now that the management implemented an organizational rule which controls the firm close to a target state as described above. Now consider a change in the preferences of the customers, e.g., a change in the parameter b. This would cause a shift in the target state (e.g., the equilibrium or the 2-cycle, see Table 1 ). If this shift is strong enough, then the production path would not be close to the new target state any more causing the production sequence to fluctuate erratically again. The management would again have to go through the steps described above to find organizational rules which effectively stabilize and control the firm in a neighborhood of the new target state.
With this extension we arrive at a framework to understand how organizations adapt and evolve when confronted with dynamically changing market conditions. The firm might evolve on a chaotic attractor in which unstable target states -the "islands of stability" -are embedded.
To bring the firm in a situation of success the management has to select one of these target states and find a suitable chosen intervention to bring the firm close to this state and implement organizational rules to control the firm close to it. In dynamic, changing markets such a successful stabilization can only be temporary, as market conditions change and renders previously useful organizational rules useless. The organization needs to respond to these sudden and unusual circumstances and instabilities in their environments. The management has to adjust the organizational rules either to keep the firm close to the shifted target state or to select a new target and to steer the firm close to it by a suitable adaptation.
Our model captures remarkably well the process of organizational change as often described in organizational research (see Guastello 1995) : Organizational change occurs in three stagesunfreezing, change, freezing. During the unfreezing stage, the organization gets used to the idea that change is necessary. This coincides in our model with the observation that previously used organizational rules no longer work in the changed environment. The refreezing part of the process is the phase where the newly formed patterns of behavior have become stabilized in the organization's behavior strategy. This coincides with the implementation of organizational rules which keep the organization close to the chosen target state. Also Amburgey et al. (1993) remark that, "... there is considerable evidence that organizations pass from periods of volatility and change into periods of relative stability". (p. 55). The model proposed here is also in line with rational adaptation theory, which suggests that organizational development reflects designed changes in strategy and structure of individual organizations in response to environmental changes. It is also quite apt to illustrate Hannan and Freeman' s structural inertia theory: "Learning and adjusting structure enhances the chance of survival only if the speed of response is commensurate with the temporal patterns of relevant environments. Indeed, the worst of all possible worlds is to change structure continually only to find each time upon reorganization that the environment has already shifted to some new configuration that demands yet a different structure. Learning and structural inertia must be considered in a dynamic context." (Hannan and Freeman 1984, p. 151) . Imagine that a shift in a structural parameter has caused a shift in the resulting target state, and rendered the previously implemented organizational rules unsuccessful in controlling the firm. The management tries to gather information in order to determine which new target state they would like to select, and to formulate rules which leads the firm to the new target and keep the organization close to this state. Unfortunately, when the management has been successful in developing and implementing these rules, a shift in the same structural parameter has shifted the target states again, rendering the designed rules useless. Finally, it is worth mentioning that after the occurrence of a shift in a structural parameter, an older firm finds itself in a similar situation as a newly founded firm, in the sense that both have to think about the best fit of their organization to the current environment. Although younger firms usually have a higher probability to exit the market, change can be thought of as resetting the liability-of-newness clock (Amburgey et al. 1993 ).
Conclusions
Organizations have counteracting external and internal forces at play. Spontaneous new ideas generate instabilities as they involve deviations from prior plans. Experimentation and individual initiative are sources of instability which push the organization out of its programmed course. The environment changes quickly over time and destabilizes the previously found order. Some forces, on the other hand, push the organization toward stability and order, e.g., planning, structuring and controlling. In this paper we developed a new view of organizations in disequilibrium. As in previous work on this topic we assume that the firm might evolve on a chaotic attractor, but here we do not consider this state as desirable or as the final state to which the system converges. In the framework considered here the management has an active role: It selects a suitable target state, learns about the global dynamical properties of the system, finds an intervention to bring the firm close to this target state, and implements organizational rules to stabilize and control the firm there. On the chaotic attractor this target state is unstable and in this sense the firm is always out of equilibrium. It is the task of the management to find and implement organizational rules which lead the firm into a desired region even if the firm's evolution occurs on a chaotic attractor. Since the environment evolves over time, the current organizational rules have to be changed and adapted too. Our concept of managing change, however, is not build on the idea that stability is desirable, or how to get from one state of stability to another when the environment changes. Here we argue that decision makers have to accept that change is continuous, and that the states which can be reached are unstable states, and can only be sustained by persistent monitoring and effort of the management. In this sense organizations have to become skilled at influencing and adapting to continuous change. In a similar fashion, the values for the average revenue and the average sales given in Table 2 can be calculated. Figure 1: Production path for x 0 = 2.56 and κ 0 = 1/4. Without control the production quantities generated by using decision rule (1) fluctuate erratically (top). A slight adjustment of the control parameter κ (only) in the first period brings the production path close to the unstable equilibrium x ** and effectively removes the fluctuations in the short run (bottom). . Every time the path leaves the predetermined neighborhood (top), a suitable, but small adjustment of the control parameter κ is made (bottom), which brings the path back to the target.
